Nuclear threat

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (weapon of mass destruction) has become a metaphor for 21st-century gage concerns. Although thermonuclear weapons have not been used since the end of World warfargon II, their influence on international protection affairs is pervasive, and possession of WMD remains an important divide in international politics at once (Norris 61).The nuclear attitudes of the precedent Cold fight rivals have evolved more late than the fast-breaking political developments of the decade or so that has elapsed since the source Soviet concretion collapsed. Nevertheless, some important changes have already interpreted place. By mutual consent, the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972 was terminated by the unify States and Russia, which have concord to modify their nuclear offensive force stomachure signifi crumbtly through a large reduction in the total of deployed delivery systems.nuclear weapons are no longer at the center of this bila terally symmetrical relationship. Although the two nations are pursuing divergent doctrines for their residual nuclear weapons aim, neither approach poses a threat to the other. The complex body part, but not the detailed content, of the upcoming U.S. nuclear posture was expressed in the 2002 Nuclear Posture review (NPR), which established a significant doctrinal shift from admonishrence to a more complex approach to addressing the conundrum of proliferated WMD.The Russian doctrinal reading to the post-Cold fight security environment is somewhat more opaque. The government appears to be focused on ontogeny and fielding low-yield weapons that are more suited for t put to workical use, though the current building of new missiles and warheads may be associated with new strategic nuclear payloads as well. Despite the diminished postCold War role of nuclear weapons in the United States, the additive deterioration of Russias conventional army force since 1991 has actually made nuclear weapons more central to that governments defense form _or_ system of government.The end of the adversarial relationship with the Soviet Union (and later, the Russian Federation) had to be comportn into account in the NPR. The current nuclear posture is evolving in a manner parallel to the modernization of the U.S. non-nuclear forces establishment. In stark contrast to Cold Warera multitude planning, the 21st century is likely to be characterized by circumstances in which the adversary is not well known far in go of a potential confrontation.The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) is adjusting to these new circumstances by developing highly capable and flexible phalanx forces that can alter to the characteristics of adversaries as they appear. This makes the traditional path to modernization through investment in weapons systems as the threat emerges economically infeasible. Modern information technology lets the military change the characteristics of its flexible weapo ns and forces in some(prenominal) less time than it would take to develop whole new weapons systems. Thus, DOD is attempting to create a military information system the integrated effect of command-control-communications-computation-intelligence-surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR). This system is inherently more flexible for adapting to changes in the threat environment.WMD and the means to deliver them are mature technologies, and knowledge of how to create such capabilities is widely distributed. Moreover, the congeneric greet of these capabilities declined sharply toward the end of the 20th century. Today, the poorest nations on earth (such as compass north Korea and Pakistan) have found WMD to be the most attractive melodic phrase available to meet their security needs (Lieggi 2). Proliferation of WMD was stimulated as an unintended consequence of a U.S. failure to invest in technologies such as ballistic missile defense that could have dissuaded nations from investing in such weapons.The United States preoccupation with deterring the Soviet Union incorporated the wrong assumption that success in that arena would deter proliferation elsewhere (Barnaby 7). This defect was compounded by the perverse interaction between defense form _or_ system of government and arms control in the 1990s. Mis lay confidence was lodged in a network of multilateral agreements and practices to prevent proliferation that contributed to obscuring rather than illuminating what was happening. Confidence placed in the inspection provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), for example, obscured efforts to set out knowledge of clandestine WMD programs. NPT signatories were among those nations with clandestine WMD programs.Without a modernization of defense polity, the ready availability of WMD-related technology will converge with their declining relative cost and a fatally flawed arms control structure to stimulate further proliferation in the 21st centur y. The process whereby WMD and ballistic missile technology has proliferated among a group of nations that otherwise share no common interests are likely to become the template for 21st-century proliferation.The oscilloscope of this problem was recognized in part as a result of a comprehensive review of intelligence data in 19971998 by the kick to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States (the Rumsfeld Commission). This recognition fleetly evolved into a set of significant policy initiatives that responded to changes in the international security environment. The arms control arrangements most closely identified with the adversarial relationship with the former Soviet Union were pass. In 1999 the Senate refused to ratify the Comprehensive visitation Ban Treaty the United States and Russia ended the 1972 ABM Treaty and agreed to jettison the START process, which kept nuclear deployments at Cold War levels in favor of much(prenominal) deeper reductions in offensiv e forces in 2002.U.S. policy began to evolve in response to these developments. The incompatibility between the Cold War legacy nuclear posture and the 21st-century security environment stimulated a search for approaches to modernize policies pertinent to nuclear weapons. In response to statutory direction, the Bush administration published the Quadrennial Defense Review, the Nuclear Posture Review, the case Defense Strategy of the United States, and the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of draw Destruction. Taken together, these documents constitute the most profound change in U.S. policy related to nuclear weapons since the Eisenhower administration (Krepon1).The unique capabilities of nuclear weapons may distillery be required in some circumstances, but the range of alternatives to them is much greater today. The evolution of technology has created an opportunity to move from a policy that deters through the threat of massive retaliation to one that can reasonably aspire to the more demanding aimto dissuade. If adversary WMD systems can be held at risk through a combination of precision non-nuclear motivate and active defense, nuclear weapons are less necessary (Albright 2). By developing a military capability that holds a proliferators entire WMD posture at risk rather than relying solely on the ability to deter the threat or use of WMD after they have been developed, produced, and deployed, the prospects for diminution the role of WMD in international politics are much improved.The 21st-century proliferation problem creates a set of targets significantly different from those that existed during the Cold War. a couple of(prenominal) targets can be held at risk only by nuclear weapons, but the ones that are appropriate may require different characteristics and, in many circumstances, different designs than those currently in the nuclear stockpile. The nature of the targets and the scope of the potential threat also alter the character of the underl ying scientific, engineering, and industrial infrastructure that supports the nuclear weapons posture. This investigate paper will therefore desire to discuss the problem of nuclear devices or WMDs (as they are presently termed) and try on to address to current policy issues skirt the matter.RESEARCH OUTLINEINTRODUCTIONa.) what is the problem surrounding nuclear threats in the 21st centuryb.) what are the recent developments surrounding this issuec.) what solutions have been successful in addressing these problemBODYa.) who are nuclear threatsb.) what has been done to stopc.) What can be done?d.) What can the US do? What can the UN do?CONCLUSIONReferencesRobert Norris and Hans Kristensen, Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2006, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 62. no. 3 (2006) 61.Stephanie Lieggi, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Going Beyond the Stir the strategic realities of Chinas No First Use policy, Nuclear Threat Initiative, http//www.nti.org/analysis/articles/realities -chinas-no-first-use-policy/ (accessed June 30, 2006).Frank Barnaby and Shaun Barnie, Thinking the unthinkable Japanese nuclear power and proliferation in East Asia (Oxford, UK Oxford Research gathering and Citizens Nuclear Information Center, 2005) 78.George Perkovich, Indias Nuclear Bomb The shock absorber on Global Proliferation, (Berkeley University of California Press, 1999.)Michael Krepon, Rodney W. Jones & Ziad Haider eds., Escalation Control & the Nuclear Option in South Asia, The Henry L. Stimson Center, family line 2004, https//www.stimson.org/?id=191, (May 2005).Text of Export Controls on Goods, Technologies, Material, and Equipment Related to Nuclear and Biological Weapons and their Delivery Systems Act, 2004, Published in Gazette of Pakistan, 27 September 2004, Cited at, http//www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/ Infcircs/2004/infcirc636.pdf, (May 2005).Michael Krepon and Chris Gagne eds., The Stability-Instability Paradox Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Brinksmanship in South Asia, The Henry L. Stimson Center, June 2001, https//www.stimson.org/research?ID=1, (May 2005).Feroz Hassan Khan, The Independence-Dependence Paradox Stability Dilemmas in South Asia, Arms Control Association, October 2003, https//www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_10/Khan_10, (May 2005).Ashley J. Tellis, Indias Emerging Nuclear Posture Between Recessed hinderance and Ready Arsenal, (Santa Monica Rand, 2001.)