Lakatos and MacIntyre on Incommensurability and the Rationality of Theory-change :: Science Scientific Philosophy Essays

Lakatos and MacIntyre on Incommensurability and the Rationality of Theory-changeABSTRACT Imre Lakatos methodology of scientific look programs and Alasdair MacIntyres tradition-constituted enquiry atomic number 18 two sustained attempts to overcome the assumptions of uniform empiricism, while saving the port that theory-change is rational. The key difference between them is their antithetical stand on the comeback of incommensurability between large-scale theories. This divergence generates other aras of disagreement the most grievous are the relevance of the historical record and the presence of decision criteria that are cat valium to rival programs. I take that Lakatos rejection of the incommensurability thesis and dismissal of unfeigned history are motivated by the belief that neither are compatible with the tenableness of theory-change. If MacIntyre washstand deny the necessity of dispensing with the historical record, and exhibition that incommensurability and the consequent absence of shared decision criteria are compatible with rationality in theory-change, then Lakatos argument will lose its force, and MacIntyre will rectify honor the intention to take seriously the historicality of science. I argue that MacIntyre can dissolve tensions between incommensurability and rationality in theory-change if he is able, first, to distinguish a sense of the incommensurability thesis that preserves genuine rivalry between theories, and second, to show that the possibility of rationality in theory-change depends non on the presence of common decision criteria, yet on the fact that traditions can fail by their own standards. After reconstructing and examining the argument, I conclude that the notion of a traditions intrinsic failure is coherent, but that it leaves crucial questions about the epistemology and ontology of traditions that must be answered if MacIntyres proposal of marriage is to constitute a genuine improvement on Lakatos. Although he i s not primarily a philosopher of science, Alasdair MacIntyre has drawn on post-Kuhnian methodological reflection in his formulation of an historicist theory of knowledge (1984a 271) or what his more recent feed terms tradition-constituted inquiry (1988 354). In many respects, MacIntyres traditions are similar to the research programs described in the work of Imre Lakatos (1977). Both thinkers propose a gap in focus from atomic propositions to some type of holism by making an entire theory, or series of theories, the proper object of evaluation. each argues that the issues investigated by participants in research traditions are not timeless questions, but are crucially shaped by their own problematics. Without devaluing consistency and logical rigor, each supposes that incoherence of a certain sort is the motor of gifted progress.